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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record 2214 
SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY 
versus 
CITY OF DANVILLE. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable, the Chief Just-ice mid Justices of the Su-
pt·eme Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Southern Railway Company (hereinafter · 
for convenience called "the Railway Co.") shows that it is 
aggrieved by a final judgment of the Corporation .Court of 
Danville, entered on th~ 5th day of July, 1939, in an action 
at law, by Notice of Motion, wherein the City of Danville 
(hereinafter for convenience called "the City") was plain-
tiff, and the Railway Co. was defendant. 
The judgment is for $686.70 subject to a credit of $444.96 
paid into Court before trial. The case involves the construc-
tion of a. statute and ordinance imposing taxes. 
From a transmipt of the Record the following will appear 
as 
241< *THE FACTS AND· PROCEEDINGS. 
The City of Danville brought its ,Notice of Motion against 
the Railway Co. in the Corporation Court of Danville. 
2 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Honorable Henry C. Leigh disquaH:fied himself and the 
Honorable Frank T. Sutton, Jr., of the Law and Eq"!-lity Court 
of the City of Richmond, Part Two, was duly designated to 
hear and to decide the ca use in the Corporation Court of 
Danville. 
Neither party desiring a jury, all questions of law and 
fact were submitted to the Court and the Agreed Statement 
of Facts ref erred to in the Opinion of Judge Sutton, which 
opinion is made a part of the Record {M:S. R., p. 11), is 
taken from the sing·lc Certificate of Exceptions and is for 
the convenience of the Court, here reproduced (MS. R., p. 
22). 
''.A.GREED STATEMENT OFF-ACTS. 
'' As of January 1, 1935, the City of Danville, a municipal 
corporation of Virginia, assessed municipal taxes against the 
Southern Railway Compa'ny in the total amount of $8,899.05, 
covering· levy on real estate and tangible personal property, 
such taxes being for the calendar year 1935. . 
''On June 27, 1936, the Southern Railway Company paid 
to D. P. Garvin, City Collector, said sum of $8,899·.05. 
"Under date of December 8, 19'36, Southern Railway Com-
pany tendered to said D. P. iGarvin, City Collector, the. sum 
of $457 .60 in payment of all penalties and interest which had 
accrued by reason of the failure of said taxpayer to pay the 
taxes assessed as above for the year 1935, before January 1, 
1936, but said City Co1Iector refused the tender, because he 
claimed that the tender consisted only of $444.96 plus· $12.64 
· interest, being interest on the penalty from.June 16, 1936, 
and said City Collector claimed that taxpayer was due the 
City of Danville interest on the penalty of $444.96 from J anu-
ary 15, 1936, and that taxpayer also owed the City of Dan-
ville interest at 6 per cent on $8,899.05 ( the amount of taxes 
paid June 2-7, 1936), from January .16, 1936. The defend-
ant, as of the return day of this notice, paid into court, to 
the clerk thereof, the sum of $457.60 (made up of the penalty 
of $444.96 and interest thereon- of $12.64), which had been 
tendered to Hon. D. P. -Garvin, Collector. 
'' The only question in this case is whether the taxpayer 
3* owes *interest on the assessment of $8,899.05. The City 
of Danville claims that defendant was liable for interest 
on the principal and the penalty from January 15, 1936. De-
fendant has paid· into court the penalty of- 5 per cent and in-
terest thereon to date same was tendered the Citv Collector ~ ' 
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and contends that ll!asmuch as it paid the taxes before June 
30, 1936, no interest accrued, and it is the ref ore not liable 
for interest.'' 
ASSIGNMENT OF E.RROR. 
Petitioner assigns as error the holding of the Honorable 
Frank T. Sutton, Jr., Judge Designate, that Sec. 114 of the 
Ordinances of the ,City of Danville was not in conflict with 
and rendeted invalid by Sec. 372 Tax Code, State of Virginia, 
and the holding that the tax in the form of interest should 
have been assessed and collected against the Railway Co. un-
der the provisions of .Sec. 114 of the ·City Ordinances from 
January 15, 1936, and not from June 16, 1936, the date fixed 
by the State Tax Code Sec. 372. 
Petitioner, therefore, contends that there is error in the 
judgment of the Court awarding any arp.ount to the City of 
:t;)anville and contends that judgment should have been en-
tered fc;>r the Railway Co. in the Corporation Court of Dan-
ville, and that such judgment should now be entered by this 
Honorable Court. -
Sec. 114 of the City Ordinances relied upon by the City, is 
set out in the Notice of Motion (MS. R., p. 3) : 
''Sec. 114. Interest at the rate of six per centum per annum 
is hereby imposed and shall be charged and collected upon all 
city taxes and levies, however such taxes or levies may have 
been or may hereafter be assessed or assessable which may 
have heretofore not been paid or may hereafter remain unpaid 
on .the fifteenth day of J'll-ne in the year succeeding ·that in 
which .mch taxes or levies have been or may be assessed. Such 
interest shall be charged and computed from the fifteenth day 
of January in the year sucxa.eeding that in which taxes have 
been or ma.y be assessed, and shall be collected and accounted 
for by the Collector along with the principal sum thereof and 
with any penalties incurred or accrued for default in the due 
· payment of the sum in the same manner that said taxes. 
4• or levies are or may be authorized or *required by law 
to be collected.'' ( Italics supplied.) 
Whereas the material part of the State Law, Sec. 372 Tax 
Code, which is found in Acts of General Assembly, Extrsi 
Session, 1933; page 60, reads as follows : 
. '' AnY: person failing to pay any State taxes or county and 
city lemes on or before the fifth day of DecernlJer, shall incur 
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the amount of taxes or levies due from such taxpayer, which, 
a penalty thereon of five per centum, which shall be added to 
when collected by the treasurer, shall be accounted for in 
his settlements. 
"Interest at the rate of six per centum per annum from 
the sixteenth da.y of June of the year next following the as-
sessment year shall be collected upon the principal and pen-
alties of all such taxes and levies then remaining unpaid, 
* * • . " ( Italics supp lied.) 
The principal tax against the Railway Co. of $8,899.05 was 
assessed in 1935 and paid June 27, 1936. 
From ~ reading of this Ordinance and the pertinent part 
of Sec. 372 it will be seen that the City .Ordinance undertakes 
to say that if this tax which was assessed against the Rail-
way for the year 1935 was not paid by the 15th of June, 
1936, that then interest at 6% should be added, not from the 
15th of June, 1936, but from the 15th day of Jamtary, 1936, 
whereas the State law provides that as to this same City tax, 
which was assessed against the Railway in 1935, that if the 
1935 tax was not paid by Decemb.er 5, 1935, that a penalty 
of 5 % should be added, and that interest should be assessed 
not from January Hi, 1936, but from J1.1.ne 16, 1936. 
~o that, we have a City Ordinance and a State statute in 
direct conflict. The .Ordinance fixing the day of default which 
would cause interest to be assessed as the 15th day of June, 
19:36, and the State Statute fixing this default day as the 16th 
day of June, 1936, and providing· that the interest runs from 
that day, i. e., the 16th day of June, 1936, whereas, the City 
claims that under its Ordinance if the tax is not paid by the 
15th of June, 1936, that then interest shall be assessed 
5* and that the City has the right *to go back to the arbi-
trary date of the 15th day of January, 1936. This solely 
by reason of the City Ordinance. "' 
The Honorable Frank T. Sutton, Jr., presiding over the 
Corporation Court of Danville held that the City Ordinance 
was valid, not affected by the State law, and apparently based 
his conclusion, in part, upon the following paragraph of Sec. 
372 Acts of Assembly, 1933: 
''But this parag-raph shall not apply to local levies in any 
city or town where penalty or interest on such levies is reO'u-
lated by its charter, or by other special p·rovis,ions of la;,." 
( Italics supplied.) . 
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ARGUMENT AiND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES. 
Discussion of Sec. 297 Acts of 1934. 
This section is referred to by Judge Sutton in his opinion 
(p. 12, MS. R.). 
That opinion reaches the conclusion that the use of the 
word "penalty" is broad enough to give to the City of Dan-
ville, in the absence of any express charter provision, the 
right to fix by ordinance a retroactive date from which vn-
terest shall run. -
. The R~ilway Co. takes the yiew that Sec. 297 has no bear-
ing upon this case; that it was an A.ct first passed in 1926, 
amended in 1934, again amended in 1936. .That at no time 
did it ref er to interest, and that the sole purpose of the 
statute was to permit the City Council to pass Ordinances for 
the collection of taxes in installments. 
It obviously and plainly refers only to giving the several 
Cities authority to depart from the method fixed for collect-
ing all taxes at one time, and its sole purpose was to give to 
the several cities the right to put into effect an installment 
system of collecting. It has, we submit, no bearing what-
soever upon the question of from what date interest is 
6• to be •computed on an unpaid local tax. . · 
The learned Court below expresses the view that the 
word "penalties'' (plural) in Tax Code Sec. 297 is broad 
enough to include '' A. penalty in the broader sense of in-
terest'' (MS. R., p. 14). 
This section of the Tax Code was first enacted by the Gen-
eral Assembly in 1926 (A.cts 1926, p. 718). It was again en-
acted with an amendment in 1934 (Acts 1934, p. 166). 
The Ordinance of the City of Danville was enacted by an 
old City Council many years before. Section 114 appears 
verbatim as Section 44 Ordinances City of Danville (pub-
lished 1923 (pp. 78-79) ). It also appears verbatim in the 
codification of 1907. But never, until now, has the City of 
Danville sought to go back to the arbitrary date of January 
15th' as the date for computing interest. 
D. P. Garvin, for many years Collector of City Taxes, com-
mitted suicide on February 18, 1939, before this case could 
be reached for trial. It was continued on tha.t account. The 
final audit of his office was mad~ by A. M. Pullen & Com-
pany. The report thereof was delivered to and accepted 
by the City Council on May 26th, 1939. 
We quote from the audit report: 
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'' Interest : 
'·' Accordino· to the city collector's cash book, interest was 
not collectel'until August 1st (law specifies June 15th). In-
terest collections, when made, as recorded in: cash book dif-
fered in the majority of instances from correct interest, the 
cause being c.omputing oi1 a period of time according· to a 
method which differed from actual time. · Such differences 
were not material in amount. 
"In- the general ledgers of the city collector and the city 
auditor the accountable charge for interest was the amount 
of interest shown on the city collector's report of payments 
to the city treasurer. Therefore, the charg·e and cash credit 
were always equal. 
7* *''Although Mr. Garvin did not charge either himself 
or the taxpayer with penalty and interest, according to 
dates prescribed by law, we have used his policy in so far 
as effective dates are concerned in determining discrepancies 
for which he is accountable. This is considered only fair as 
the policy has been in force consistently and seems to have 
been known by the city officials.'' (Pages 6 and 7, Special 
Report on Audit of the Office of D. P. Garvin, City Collector, 
A. M. Pullen & Company.) 
The Act of the General Assembly of 1926 provided for the 
collection of local taxes in equal semi-annual installments. It 
read: 
"Be it enacted by the general assembly of Virginia, That 
the council of any city or town in this State may provide, by 
ordinance, for the collection of city or town taxes or levies 
on property in eqital setni-anni,.al wzstallments at such times 
and with such penalties for non-payment as may be fixed by 
ordinance." ( Italics supplied.) 
It will be seen that the subsequent enactment of 1934 
merely made more flexible the right to collect in installments 
by leaving out the words "equal semi-annual". So that this 
1934 enabling· act gave the Cities the right by ordinance to 
provide for the collection of local taxes in installments with-
out limitation as to whether the installments should be semi-
annual, monthly, or for that matter, weekly. The two Acts 
of the General Assembly also enabled the Cities, by ordinance 
to fix penalties for non-paynient in time. Never has the Gen~ 
eral A~sem~ly at ~hese two sessions said anything as to in-
terest m tlns Sect10n 297. On the contrary, at the Session 
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o_f 1926 the General Assembly was legislating as to penal,ties 
and interest where local taxes were collected under general 
law and by Section 372, supra (Acts 1926, p. 313; 1930, p. 
121; 1933, p. 60), fixed the date from which interest on un-
paid local levies should be computed at an entirely different 
date from that sought to be fixed by Section 114 ·Ordinance 
City of Danville. . 
The Railway Co. respectfully submits that Section 297 Tax 
Code has no application to the case at bar for these reasons 
among others : 
1. Section 297 refers only to the collection of local 
s• taxes ""in installments. 
2. Section 297 enabled Cities to fix installment dates 
and penalties for non-payment of installments in time. It 
does not refer to interest. 
3. The Ordinanc,~ of the City of Danville was not passed 
pursuant to this enabHng Act, but had existed (though not ap-
plied) for many years. 
4. The tax in the case at bar was not collected under Sec-
. tion 297, or any Ordinance passed under the authority thereof 
but was assessed and collected under general law. The date 
from which interest must be computed is fixed by Tax Code 
Section 372, and that date is, as contended by the Railway 
Co., June 15, 1936. 
SECTION TAX CODE 372. 
It was admitted by the City in the lower court tl;lat there 
is no provision of the City Charter that has any bearing upon 
the right to collect interest. Indeed, the City of Danville 
in its Notice of Motion expressly relies solely upon Sec. 114 
of the City Ordinances, and the City did not rely, and can-
not rely upon any provision of the City Charter which gives 
the City the right to enact au ordinance in conflict with State 
Tax Code Section 372. 
Counsel for the Railwav Co. takes it as a concessum in 
this case that if Section i14 of the City Ordinances is in 
conflict with and repugnant to Section 372 of the Tax Code 
that the Ordinance is invalid and judg111ent in this case should 
be for the Railway Co. 
· In the late case of Old Doniinion Land Co. v. Warwick 
(Jan. 9, 1939), 200, 619, Justice Eggleston, at page 621, said: 
9* *"It is sig·nificant, too, that since the enactment of the 
sections of the Code upon which the County relies the 
General Assembly has continued to pass specific acts pr~hib-
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iting the emptying of sewage i~to certain tidal waters whe~-
ever it had desired to accomplish that end. We haye pr.evi-
ously called attention to a number of these acts. T~1s plamly 
indicates we think that the General Assembly believes that 
the nece;sary auth~rity to prevent the pollution of such tidal 
waters still rests with it." ' 
It is submitted that the enactment of Section 297 of the 
Tax Code heretofore referred to is a clear instance of the 
General Assembly passing· laws with reference to the collec-
tion of local taxes expressly g·iving to the City the right .to 
fix by ordinance the time for the collection and the penalties 
to be imposed for the failure to pay the installments. 
Section 297 does not contain any authority for the assessing 
of interest, but the General Assembly did enact a law (Sec-
tion 372) fixing the date from which interest on local taxes 
remaining unpaid should be charged. 
The position of the Railway Co. is that unless the City of 
Danville can bring itself within the exception in Section 372 
which is hereafter referred to as the '' Saving Clause'' that 
the City Ordinance, Section 114, which is alleged in the No-
tice of Motion as the authority for collecting this interest, is 
in conflict with Section 372 and therefore, wholly invalid. 
This so-called ''Saving Clause'' reads as follows: 
'' But this paragrapl1 shall not apply to local levies in any 
city or town where penalty or interest ou such levies is regu-
lated by its chart-er, or by other special provisions of law." 
(Italics supplied.) 
Obviously this paragraph which fixes the date in the case at 
bar from which interest is to be computed as June 16, 1936, 
does apply to every City which does not come clearly 
10* within the terms of the exception. *Certainly there 
could be nothing· clearer than that the General Assem-
bly in enacting· this Section 372 meant to do just what the 
Railway Co. contends that the General Assembly did do, i. e., 
fix the date from which interest was to be computed on local 
taxes in the City of Danville as June 16, 1936. 
An examination into the history of Section 372 of the Tax 
Code shows that the General Assembly in enacting that sec-
tion h!ld clearly in mind tha~ it had full authority and power 
to legislate as to the collection of local taxes and the inter-
est thereon, and that it had not delegated to the local gov-
ernments the authority to nx the date. Naturally the Gen-
eral Assembly thought it unwise to have various ordinances 
or regulations of the several Cities fixin~· the interest dat~ 
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on various dates. There should be some uniformity. A rea-
sonable amount of uniformity could be maintained if the 
General Assembly retained (as they did) the right to fix the 
interest date by legislative enactments, in the form of Char-
ter amendment or Special Law. · 
To illustrate-the petitioner in this case pays local taxes 
in many Cities and' Towns in Virginia. We mention Lynch-
burg,. Danville, Alexandria, Charlottesville, Richmond, Nor-
folk and there are, of course, many others. We submit that 
it is plain that the General Assembly did not intend to leave 
the fixing of the interest and date to the arbitrary caprice of 
rapidly changing city councils. If the City of Danville can 
go back to the arbitrary date of January 15, 1936, Lynchburg 
might go back to January 15, 1935, Richmond to July 1, 1935, 
and so on. Confusion would result. But if the date is to 
be fixed by the General Assembly the Railway Co. at least 
. has some notice. Some degree of uniformity will exist. 
11 * ii Section 372 appears as Section 2410 Code of 1919; 
. that section has no reference to interest, but Section 
2411 fixed the date of interest on local levies and fixed the 
interest date as of the 15th of June. -
The Revis ors' note to Section 2411 which for convenience 
is here quoted, shows clearly the situation: 
"The act from which this section is taken (Acts 1904, p. 
2118) was repealed by Acts 1908, p. 671, but the repeal was 
not to affect any taxes which became due and payable prior 
to the year 1908. The revisots considered it wise to restore 
the act with the following change: Under the act if the taxes 
or levies remained unpaid on the fifteenth day of June of the 
year succeeding that in which the taxes or levies were as-
sessed, the interest was to be computed from the fifteenth day 
of December in the year in which such unpaid taxes were as-
sessed or assessable. Under the present section the time 
from which the interest is to be computed is made the fifteenth 
day of June in the year after which such unpaid taxes or 
Jevies were assessed or assessable. It seems to the revisors 
that interest should be charged as an additional inducement 
for the taxpayer to· come forward and pay, but as the five 
pei· cent penalty is added after December 1st, it was thought 
that the interest should not beg-in to run until the following 
June fifteenth.'' 
From the above note it will be readily seen that beginning· 
about 1904 there was a State law which fixed the interest 
date on unpaid local levies from the 15th dav of Decem"ber of 
the year in which the taxes were assessed. w • 
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In the case at bar that would be the 15th of December, 
1935. 
ln 1908, however, that act was repealed, and as we under-
stand it durino• the period from 1908 up to the enactment 
of the Code ol' 1919 no interest could be collected by virtue 
of any State Law. 
What is now Section 372 of the Tax Code was amended as 
Section 2410 Acts of .Assembly 1926, page 313, but this Sec~ 
tion 2410 contains no reference as to interest and the 
12,jt amendment is immaterial so far as this *case is con-
cerned. 
Section 2411, the section with reference to interest, does 
not seem to be amended under 1926 Act. 
As we understand it, the Tax Code of Virginia was en-
acted in 1928 Acts of Assembly 1928, beginning at page 35. 
There Section 2410 of the Code of 1919 appears as Section 
372 (Acts 1928, p. 209). That section says nothing as to in-
terest. Section 2411 of the Code of 1919-the section as to 
interest-appears as Section 373 (Acts 1928, p. 210); and in-
terest on local taxes is fixed to run from the 16th day of June 
of the year after the year in which the local taxes were as-
sessed. 
Section 373 of the Code contains the so-called '' Saving 
Clause" in the identical wording as it now appears in Sec-
tion 372. 
A.t the 1933 General Assembly, Acts of 1933, page 60, Sec-
tion 373 as to interest was repealed, it having been consoli-
dated with Section 372, and the Act of September 11, 1933, is 
the Act appearing in the 1934 edition of the Tax Code which 
is a consolidation of Sections 372 and 373. All of this for 
the purpose of showing· that the General Assembly has con-
sistently throug·hout a11 of these years legislated upon the 
coJlection of local taxes and the interest thereon; that they 
have not by general law made this a question for the local 
authorities, and that, therefore, the case at bar comes squarely 
within the reasoning of Justice Eggleston in the Warwick 
County case, supra. . 
It would seem certain that unless the City of Danville can 
bring itself within the provisions of the "Saving Clause", 
which appeared as far back as the 1919 Code, and has con-
tinued without chang·e except as transferred from Section 
373 to 372 up to the present date, that the position of the 
Railway Co. that the date from which interest is to be cal-
culated is June 16, 1936, is sound, and that the judgment 
13* of the Court should have been for· the defendant. 
*The "Saving Clause" it is submitted clearly does not 
Sout,iern Railway Company y. City of Danville. 11 
apply to the Uity of Danville for the following reasons, 
among others : 
1. Interest on such levies, i. e., local levies, is not regulated 
by the City Charter. That is conceded. 
2. The phrase ''other special provisions of law" must have 
been carefully considered by the Reyisors, and when the 
word ''other'' is considered it must ref er back to the word 
"charter'' thereby meaning provisions of law similar to the 
charter which is a legislative enactment: 
3. In at least two sessions of the General Assembly of Vir-
ginia, that law-making body passed two Acts (Sections 297 
and 372, supra), dealing with the collection of local taxes. 
In Section 297 providing for installment collection the word 
''ordinance'' is used, but when at those two same sessions 
the General Assembly was exercising their authority to pro-
vide for interest they used entirely different words. 
· Can it be said that in using entirely different words at the 
same session the General Assembly meant to say exactly the 
same thing? -
~ In one section (297) providing for collection of local taxes 
in installments it used the word ''ordinance'' whereas when 
it was providing for the date from which interest would run, 
it did not use the word "ordinance". If it had intended to 
embrace ordinances it would have_ been quite simple to hav~ 
left out the entire phrase "charter", ''or other special pro-
visions of law'' and simply said "valid ordinance". 
4. Attention is called to the fact that there was quite a 
period when there was no provision of the State law as to 
the collection of interest after the repeal of 1908, and that 
then the Legislature began anew as of the Code of 1919 to 
legislate on the subject of interest on local taxes. 
14* •n is submitted that a correct interpretation of this 
paragraph of Section 372 excepts those cities where the 
interest on the local levies is regulated by the Charter-which 
is a special Act of the General Assembly-or a similar spe-
cial act of the General Assembly which would have the same 
effect as a charter provision, aithough it might be a special 
law applying· also to other cities. (See Virginia Constitution, 
Section 51.) 
For illustration, it could not be well argued that this· ex-
ception or '' Saving ·Clause'' would apply to an or'dinance or 
a resolutton of a Board of Supervisors, and yet, under the 
construct10n of the Honorable Court the words would be so 
all embracing as· to include such resolutions. 
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Counsel for the Railway ·Co. do not take issue with the line 
of cases holding that where a statute or other langua~e u~es · 
simply the words "by law" or "a law" that a vahd City 
Ordinance might not be well embraced. The burden would 
be upon the Railway Co. to show that Danville's City Or-
dinance, Section 114, was not embraced, had that language 
been used by the General Assembly. 
The Railway Co. contends that the phrase '' or other spe-
cial provisions of law" used in the so-called "Saving Clause" 
refers back to the Charter or enactments of a similar nature 
made by the General Assembly. · 
A definition of what is "a special provision of law" is 
found in Martin's Ex'rs. v. Com·monwealth, 126 Va. 603. 
We quote from the Syllabus in that case: 
''2. STATUTES-General and Special Laws-Definition. 
Under the constitutional prohibition of special legislation 
many attempts have been made to define general and special -
laws, and to lay down some specific rule for the guidance of 
the legislature and the courts, but is not too much to say 
that no satisfactory rule has yet been obtained. It is, of 
course, apparent that a statute applicable to the whole State, 
and to all persons, bodies corporate, and·property within 
15* the *State, is general, but as a practical matter such 
statutes are relatively few in number. It is, therefore, 
impossible to fix any definite rule by which to solve the ques-
tion whether a law is local or general. 
'· 3. STATUTES-Special and General-Definition of 
Special Law.-A law is special in a constitutional sense when 
by force of an inherent limitation it arbitrarily separates some 
persons, places, or things from those upon which, but for such 
separation, it would operate.'' 
'I1he City of Danville concedes that there is nothing in its 
charter that has any bearing on this case. If the City of Dan-
ville wanted to provide for the collection of interest by go-
ing· back to a date six months before the date :fixed by general 
law for other localities of the State, the City should have. 
had its charter amended to bring itself within the exception 
in Section 372, or else the several ·Cities. of the State might 
well have asked the General Assemblv for an enactment of 
'' special provisions of ]aw'' which while not actually a part 
of the charter of the several cities, would be '' a special pro-
vision of law'' which would apply only to certain cities accord-
ing to their population, location or other limitations that the 
General Assembly saw fit to place in this ''special law". The 
Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia are full of these 
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special laws which apply to some cities and do not apply to 
others. 
Wherefore, Southern Railway Company, defendant in the 
Corporation Court of Danville, prays that it may be granted 
a writ of error and siipersedeas and that the judgment of 
the Corporation Court of Danville may be reversed and 
judgment entered by this Honorable Court for this petitioner. 
The Railway Co. desires an opportunity to present this pe-
tition orally. 
The Railway Co. avers ,that a copy of this petition was, on 
the 28th day of August, 1939, delivered to the Honorable A. 
M. Aiken, City Attorney of the City of Danville, who 
16* was attorney of record for the *plaintiff in the Corpora-
tion Court of Danville. 
Should writ of error be allowed the Railway Co. will adopt 
this petition as its opening brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, 
By THOMAS B. GAY, 
By MALCOLM K. HAR.RIS, 
I ts Attorneys. 
The undersigned attorneys at law practicng· in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that in their 
opinion the above styled case of Southern Railway Company 
v. City of Danville should be reviewed by the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia. 
Dated this 25th day of August, 1939. 
Received August 25, 1939. 
Received Sept. 22, 1939. 
THOMAS B. GAY, 
MALCOLM K. HAR,RIS. 
M. B. ·w ATTS, Clerk. 
C. V. S. 
Granted. Writ of error and supersedeas. Bond $250.00. 
C. VERNON SPRATLEY. 
Sept. 22/39. 
Recd. Sept. 22, 1939. 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD. 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Judge of the Corporation Court'of Dan~ 
ville at the courthouse thereof, on the 5th day of July; 
ffi3~ .. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit, on the 17th day 
of June, 1938, came the City of Danville, and by its Attorney 
filed in the Clerk's Office of said Court its notice to· recover 
judgment against the Southern Railway Company, which no-
tice is in the following words and figures, to-wit: · 
NOTICE. 
To the Southern Railway Company, a corporation duly char-
tered and doing business under the .laws of Virginia: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned, City of 
Danville, a municipal corporation of Virginia, will on Sep-
tember 5, 1938, at 10:00 A. M. o'clock, or as soon thereafter 
as counsel may be heard, move the Corporation Court of the 
City of Danville ( or will make such motion on the following 
day if the Court observes a holiday on September 5), for a 
judgment against you in the amount of Four Hundred Forty-
four Dollars and ninety-six cents ($444.96), with interest 
thereon at the rate of six per cent (6%) from January 15, 
1936, until paid, being the penalty of five per cent 
page 2 ~ (5%) on the taxes assessed against you hy the City: 
of Danville for 1935, in the amount of Eight Thou-
sand, Eigh Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars and five cents 
($8~899.05), and also for the interest on Eight Thousand 
Eight Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars and five cents 
($8,899.05), which interest amounts between the dates of 
January 15, 1936, to June 27, 1936, to Two Hundred Forty-one 
dollars and seventy-four cents ($241.74) and also will ask for 
a ;judgment against you for six per cent ( 6%) interest on the 
interest unpaid at that time, tbat is June 27, 1937, in the 
amount of Two Hundred Forty-one dollars and seventy-four 
cents ($241.74), from June 27, 1936, until same is paid. 
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. The above penalty and interest is chargeable ~gainst you 
under the laws of Virginia and under the following ordinances 
of the .City of Danville in force at the time that said taxes 
were assessed and assessable against you and at th~ time that 
such penalty and interest accrued against you. 
Section 112 of the ordinances of the City of Danville in 
force i1i the time reads as follows: 
'' Sec. 112. The Collector shall, immediately after the re~ 
ceipt of the books or certificates of assessment of real and 
personal estate from the Commissioner of Revenue, proceed 
..to collect the levies and taxes therein assessed and for this 
purpose. shall advertise at least six days at the Courthouse 
in the City of Danville and in such other manner as may be 
. necessary to g·ive general notice thereof upon what 
page 3} day or days he will receive taxes and levies and 
shall, at the time specified, keep his office open dur- ~ 
ing ,the day for the purpose of receiving one-half or all the 
t~xes a,nd levies for the City of Danville, whichever the tax-
payer may elect to pay, and shall receive the same when€ver 
tendered, up to and inGluding the first day of ,July of each 
year, or if that day falls on· Sunday or a legaLholiday, up to 
and including- the second day of July or the day following such 
Sunday or leg·al holiday. Upon all taxes which under this 
ordinance become due and payable on or before the first day 
of July of each year, as set forth, and which are not then 
paid, there shall _be added a pen~lty of five per cent, which 
said Collector shall collect and account for as in the case of 
taxes. and levies and all payments shall be applied by the 
Collector to the taxes and penalties as due." 
And Section 114 of said ordinances in force at such time 
reads as follows: 
"Sec. 114. Interest at the rate of six per centum per an- -
num is hereby imposed and shall be charged and collected 
upon all city taxes and levies, however such taxes or levies 
may have been or may hereafter be assessed or assessable 
which may1 have heretofore not been paid or may hereafter 
remain unpaid on the fifteenth day of June in the year suc-
ceeding that in which such taxes or levies have been or may 
be assessed. Such interest sl1all be charged and computed 
from the :fifteenth day of January in the year succeeding that 
in which taxes have been or may be assessed, · and 
page 4 ~ shall be collected and accounted for by the Collector 
_ · along with the principal sum thereof and with any 
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penalties h;i~urred or accrued for def au!t in the due p~yment 
of the su:in .1n: the same manner that said taxes or levies are 
or may be ~uthorized or required by law to be collected.'' 
The said.ltems have not been paid and are due and owing to 
the City of Danville by you by virtue of the laws of the Com-
monwealth and said ordinances. 
Statements of the above interest and penalty prepared by 
the City Collector are attached hereto and made a part of 
this notice. 
Respectfully, 
CITY OF DANVILLE, 
By A. M. AIKEN, 
City Attorney. 
COPY STATE.l\iIENT. 
Danville, Va., .......... 193 .. 
M Southern Railway Company 
To CITY OF DANVILLE, Dr. 
. \,• ., 
Make Check payable to D. P. GARVIN, Collector 
Credit . . . . ....................... Division 
To penalty on $8,899.05-1935 City Taxes at 5% 444.96 
To interest on $444.96-1935 Penalty at 6% from Jann-· 
ary 15, 1936, to date 
To interest on $8,899.05-1935 City Taxes at 6% from 
January 15, 1936, to ,June 27, 1936, 241.74 
page 5 ~ To interest on $241. 7 4 Interest at 6% from 
June 2-7, 1936, to date 
RETURN OiN NOTICE. 
Executed on the 14th day of June, 1938. 
Not finding· the President, Vice-President, Cashier, Treas-
urer, Secretary, General Manager, General Superintendent, 
or any one of the Directors of the Southern Railway Com-
pany in the City of Danville, Virginia, I executed the within 
Notice of Motion on 14th day of June, 1938, by delivering a 
true copy of same to R. W. Jones, in person, Agent of said 
Southern Railway Company y. City of Danville. 1'l 
Company, at said City wherein he resides. All done within 
my bailiwick. 
P.H. LYON, -
Sergeant City of Danville, Va. 
By N. E. DIXON, 
D. Sergt. 
Fee 75c Paid. 
And at another day, to-wit: 
Corporation Court of Danville on Tuesday the 6th day of 
September in the year A. D: 1938. 
This day came ag·ain the parties by their Attorneys, there-
upon the said defendant paid into Court to the Clerk thereof 
the sum of $457 .60 on account of the amount claimed by the 
plaintiff in said Notice and filed a Plea of Payment into 
Court. 
And at another day, to-wit: 
Corporation Court of Danville on Wednesday the 28th day 
of September in the year A. D. 1938. 
For reasons appearing to the Court, it is ordered 
page 6 ~ that the foregoing cause be continued till October 
Court next. 
And at another day, to-wit: 
·Corporation Court of Danville on Friday the 28th day of 
October in the year A. D. 1938. 
For reasons appearing· to the Court, it is . ordered that 
the fore going cause be continued till December Court next. 
And at another day, to-wit: 
Corporation Court of Danville on Friday the 23rd day of 
December in the year A. D. 1938. . 
Ji,or reason8 appearing· to the Court, it is ordered that the 
foregoing cause be continued till F·ebruary Court next. 
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. And at another day, to~wit: 
Corporation Court of Danville on Monday the 30th day of 
January in the year A. D. 1939. . 
. The Judge of this Court doth hereby enter of record that 
he is so situated in respect to this case as to render it im-
proper in his opinion for him to preside at the trial. And 
the Clerk of· this Court is hereby directed to certify this or-
der· to the Honorable E.W. Hudgins, Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
"Mailed to Hon. E. Vv. Hudgins, Justice of Supreme Co. 
of Appeals of Va., Richmond, Va., 1/30/39." 
And at another day, to-wit: 
·IN V ACATLON. 
In the Corporation Court of Danville, Va., on Monday the 
6th day of February in the year A. D. 1939. 
page 7 } . The following order was this day received from 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia and 
herein entered, to-wit:-
In Re: City of Danville v. Southern Rwy. Co. 
Virginia: 
Supreme Court of Appeals. 
To All To Whom These Presents Shall Come: . Greeting:-
Know Ye That I, Edward W. Hudgins, Justice of the Su-
preme Court .of Appeals of Virginia, by virtue of authority 
vested in me by law, do hereby designate- . 
Honorable Frank T. Sutton, Jr., Judge of the Law & 
Equity Court, Part II, of the City of Richmond, to preside 
in the Corpotation -Court of the City of Dai;iville on such day 
or days in February, 1939, as he may determine in the place 
of the Honorable Henry C. Leigh, Justice of said Court, who 
is disqualified to· preside in City of Danville v. Southern Ry~ 
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Given under mv hand and seal this 2nd day of February, 
1939. .. -
EDWARI) W. HUDGINS, (Seal) 
Justice of the Supreme Court of 
.Appeals of Virginia. 
And at another day, to-wit: 
Corporation Court of Danville on Monday the 27th day of 
February in the year A. D. 1939. 
For reasons appearing to the Court, it is ordered that this 
cause be continued till April Court next. 
page 8 } And at another day, to-wit: 
lN VACATION~ 
Corpor~tion Court of Danville on Tuesday the 25th day 
of April in the year A. D. 1939. 
The following Order was this day received from the Su~ 
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia and herein entered, to-
wit: 
Virginia: 
Supreme Court of Appeals. 
To all to Whom These Presents Shall Come-Greeting: 
Know ye, That I, Edward W. Hudgins, Justice of the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, by virtue of 
page 9 ~ authority vested in me by law, do hereby desig-
nate--
Honor~ble Frank T. Sutton, Jr., Judge of the Law & Equity · 
Court, Part Two, of the City of Richmond, to preside in the 
Corporation Court. of the City of Danville beginning the 28th 
day of April, 1939, and thereafter until the case is finally 
concluded in the place of the Honorable Henry C. Leigh, 
Judge of said Court, who is disqualified to preside in the 
case of City of Danville v. Southern Railway Company, now 
pending in said Court. 1 I ~ 
~O Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Give~_.under my hand and seal this 24th day of April, 1939._ 
EDWARD W. HUDGINS, (Seal) 
Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia. 
And at another day, to-wit: 
Corporation Court of Danville on Friday the 28th day of 
April in the year A. D. 1939. 
This day came the parties by counsel and the defendant 
having heretofore filed his plea of payment into Court to 
which the plaintiff replied generally and issue was joined, 
thereupon, both the plaintiff and defendant having waived 
trial of the issue herein by jury and electing and requesting 
that this cause be submitted to the Court for hearing and de-
termination upon an agreed statement of facts without the 
intervention of a jury, the Court having fully heard the ar-
guments of counsel,· the Court doth take time to consider of 
its judgment to be given thereupon. 
page 10 ~ And now at. this day, to-wit: 
Corporation Court of Danville on Wednesday the 5th day 
of July in the year A. D. 1939. 
This day came again the parties by their Attorneys, and 
the Court having maturely considered the evidence and the 
arguments of counsel heard at a previous sitting of the. Court, 
is of the opinion, for reasons set forth in writing· and ·now 
made a part of the record in this case, that the plaintiff is 
entitled to recover of the defendant a penalty of five per 
centum on the amount of the delinquent tax bill assessed 
against the Southern Railway Company, such penalty amount-
ing to $444.96, together with interest at the rate of six per 
. centum per annum on the principal amount of the tax bill 
from the 15th day of ,January, 1936, to the 27th day of June, 
1936, the date the bill was paid, and the Court doth so de-
cide. It is therefore considered by the Court that the City 
of Danville do recover of the defendant, Southern Railway 
Company, the sum of $686.70 subject to a credit of $444.96 
heretofore paid into court by the defendant, and the plain-
tiff's costs by it in this behalf expended. To which ruling 
and judgment of the Court, the defendant, by its attorneys, 
duly excepted. .And the said defendant intimating to the 
Court its intention to apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals 
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of Virg·inia for a writ of error and supersed,eas to the judg-
ment aforesaid, it is ordered that the same be suspended for 
ninety (90) days, upon the said defendant or some one for it 
. executing- before the Clerk of this Court bond with 
page 11 ~ approved security in the penalty of $300.00 pay-
able and conditioned according to law. 
And it is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court, to 
whom the sum of $444.96 was paid by the defendant as the 
sum total of its liability, shall turn over the said sum with 
all accrued interest thereon in his hands to the- plaintiff. 
And it appearing that Frank T. Sutton, Jr., Judge of the 
Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part T·wo, · 
was appointed to preside in this ·Court in this case, and hav-
ing appeared and discharged the duties required. of him, _it 
is. now ordered that the sum of $8.50 be allowed the said 
Frank T. Sutton, Jr., the said allowance being the expenses 
duly incurred by him in attending court in this matter, and 
this allowance is ordered to be certified to the ·Treasurer of 
the City of Danville for payment. 
l\IEMORANDU:M: BY THE COURT. 
The facts of this case are contained in the written stipu-
lation of counsel filed and made a part of the record and 
need not now be restated. -
As the tax bill in question was for the year 1935 and be-
came delinquent during that year, whatever interest and pen-
alties followed upon such delinquency must be determined 
by the law then in force. The tax legislation of 1936 ( so far 
aA this item is concerned) was not retroactive. 
The statutes ( in addition to the charter of the City of Dan-
ville) controlling are found in the Acts of 1933, page 60, 
Chapter 33, amending Section 372 of the Tax Code 
page 12 ~ and the Acts of 1934, page 166, Chapter 121, 
amending- Section 297 of the T~x Code. 
Section 297 of the Tax Code as it appears in the Acts of 
1934, pag·e 166, reads as follows : 
'·The council of any city or town in this State may pro-
vide by ordinance for the collection of city or town taxes or 
levies on property in installments at such times and with 
such penalties for nonpayment in time as may be fixed by 
ordinance.'' · 
So much of Section 372 of the Acts of 1933, page 60, as 
pertinent, reads as fo1lows: 
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"Inter~st at the rate of six per centum pe.r annum from 
the .16th · day of June of the year next ~oll?wmg the asse~s-
ment year shall be collected upon the principal and penaltres 
of all such taxes and levies then remaining unpaid, * i» '"' • ' ' 
"But this paragraph shall not apply to local levies in any 
city or town where penalty or interest on such levies ii:; regu-
lu ted by its charter, or by other special provisions of law." 
In the Charter of the City of Danville, there are to be found 
the following provisions : 
Chapter VI, paragraph 2: 
'' The Council shall have authority to adopt all needful 
rules and regulations for its government and the proper con-
duct of its business, e • • • '' 
n.age 13 t Chapter VII, paragraph 1: 
'' For the proper execution of its powers and duties and 
to meet the wants and purposes of the City, the Council is 
hel"eby vested with power and authority annually to lay and 
collect taxes on the real and personal property in said City. 
. . . " 
Chapter IX, paragraph 1: 
"There shall be a lien on real estate for the City taxes as-
sessed thereon from the commencement of the year for which 
they are assessed. * * '* The Council may require the real estate 
in said City delinquent for the non-payment of taxes to be 
sold for the same, with interest thereon and such per centum 
as it may prescribe for charges and expenses of sale and col-
lection. and may regulate the terms on which real estate may 
be sold or redeemed; • ~ • . '' 
These are the only provisions of the Charter that need be 
considered in determining this case. · 
Section 114 of Chapter XIII of the Ordinances of the City 
of Danville, provides as follows: 
"Interest at the rate of six per centum per annum is hereby 
imposed and shall be charged and collected upon all City 
taxes and levies, however such taxes or levies may have been 
or may hereafter be assessed or assessable which may have 
heretofore not been paid or may hereafter remain unpaid on 
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the 15th day of June in the year succeeding that in which such 
taxes or levies have been or may be assessed. Such interest 
shall be charged and computed from the 15th day 
page 14 }- of January in the year succeeding that in which 
taxes have been or may be assessed, • • -~ . " 
Section 297 of the Acts of 1934, su.pra, authorizes the coun-
cil of any city to prescribe penalties (plural) for non-pay-
ment of city taxes in time. It would appear that the word 
''penalties'' is used in its broader sense, and when a bill is 
allowed to become delinquent that the council is allowed to 
fix one penalty of one nature, such as a flat rate, and an-
other penalty such as interest beginning to run from a stated 
date. Such an act as this is an enabling act intended to con-
fer power and authority in a broad sense and not to destroy 
the object and purpose by so strict a construction of words 
as to defeat the purpose. The Court is of the opinion that 
the word "penalties" (plural) as used in this Section is 
broad enough to include a penalty in its narrowest sense 
and a penalty in the broader sense of interest. 
It is not necessary, however, to rely on this Section solely 
to support the contention of the City of Danville. The sec-
ond paragraph of Section 372 of the Tax Code quoted above 
is a saving clause permitting the imposition of penalty and 
interest by local authorities. The general provision fixes 
the date from which interest shall run on delinquent city 
taxes and levies from the 16th day of June, but this general 
law does not apply where local levies are "regulated by its 
charter, or by other special provisions of law". We cannot 
read this saving· clause in Section 372 without ar-
page 15 ~ riving at the conclusion that the Legislature in-
tended to g·ive free rein to the wishes of the locali-
ties in the matter of fixing the date from which delinquent 
tax bills should bear interest. 
Undoubtedly, a special date from which interest runs may 
be fixed by the charter of any particular city that desires it. 
From experience, we know these charter changes are granted 
as a matter of course when requested of the Legislature by 
the local member. Any special act of the Legislature fixing 
the date from which delinquent tax bills due to the -City of 
Danville should bear interest would be an amendment to the 
Charter of the City of Danville, and, ivso facto, a part of 
the Charter. The word "Charter" in the saving clause em-
braces every special act of the Legislature affecting the Char-
ter. A gener~l act changing the date-that is, changing the 
date m all cities not controlled by charter-would be but a 
nullification of the principal provision of Section 372 of the 
.·.' --
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Tax Code :fixi!).g a general date for those not regulated by 
charter; etc. Moreover, the saving clause does not !ef er to 
treneral acts. It reads: "by charter or other spemal pro-
~sions of Jaw." This brings us to the determination of 
what the words '' or other special provisions of law'' mean. 
They were intended to mean something. It is a cardinal 
rule of interpretation that all words used shall be given some 
meaning unless to do so· would lead to an absurdity or gross 
injustice. An ordinance duly enacted has the force 
page 16 ~ and effect of a law. It is a law. See Hopkins v. 
City of Richrnond, 117 Va. 725, and cases there 
cited. 
· Wherever an enactment by the council of a city is legisla-
tive in character, it is usually termed a law. A distinction 
is sometimes drawn where the enactment is purely of a min-
isterial nature such as the regulation of the manner of ad-
ministering the affairs of a municipal-owned utility. In the 
instant case, the ordinance is in the exercise of a govern-
mental function. .City of Lynchburg v. Lynchbitrg T. & L. 
Go., 124 Va. 130, 133. 
In MoQuillan on Mmucipal Corporations, Vol. 2, page 522, 
Section 662, it is said: 
"Ordinance as a term of municipal law is equivalent of 
legislative action and hence its employment in a constitution, 
statute or charter carries with it by natural, if not necessary, 
implication the usual incidents of such action.'' • 
Section 114 of the Code of Danville is the act of a delibera-
tive body. That such aets of a city council are termed "or-
dinances" instead of "laws'' is merely a means of con-
veniently distinguishing the acts of a city council from the 
acts of the state legislature. The nomenclature does not 
limit its force and effect. There should be no difference in 
the use of the word "law" in the phrase "other special pro-
visions of law" and its use in the phrase "required by law". 
The latter phrase has been construed to ref er to ordinances 
as well as state laws. See N .. rt W. Ry. Co. v. White, 158 Va. 
243, at page 252, where it is said: 
page 17 ~ " * * • The defendant, in stating its interpreta-
tion of the legal significance of the words 'signals 
required by law', as found in section 3959, is confident that 
ordinances of municipalities do not come within the meaning 
of the words, and cases are cit~d which it thinks sustains its 
position. The g·ist of the argument is that an ordinance is 
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not a law. This court in the case of City of Richmond v. Su-
pervisors of Henrico County, 83 Va., page 204, at page 210, 
2 S. E. 26, 29, has said: 'The ordinances of the city or reso-
lution or enactment under which it is purchased ''establishes'' , 
the hospital; for "a city council is a miniature General As-
sembly and their authorized ordinances have the force of 
laws passed by the legislature of the State.'' Taylor· v. Caron-
delet, 22 Mo. 105; Wragg v. Penn, 94 Ill. 19 (34 Am. Rep. 
199).' 
"We are unable to find that the above holding has been 
overruled or disturbed by any subsequent decision of this 
court. The Supreme Court of the United States appears to 
have taken the same view as to the leg·al effect of an or-
dinance. In the case of North American Cold Storage Co. v. 
City of Chicago, 211 ;u. S. 306, at page 313, 29 S. Ct. 101, 103, 
53 L. Ed. 195, 15 Ann. Oas. 276, Mr. Justice Peckham said, 
at page 313: 'In this case the ordinance in question is to 
be regarded as in effect a statute of the State, adopted under 
a power granted it by the State legislature, and hence it is 
an ad. of the State within the fourteenth amend-
page 18 r ment.' A.g·ain the same court in the case of the 
Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Go. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. 
S. 548, at page 555, 34 S. Ct. 364, 366, 58 L. Ed. 721, in re-
viewing a judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
which gave effect to a municipal ordinance reg-ulating• the 
operation of railroad trains in Goldsboro, says: 
'' 'A. municipal by-law or ordinance,. enacted by virtue of 
power for that purpose delegated bv the legislature of the 
State, is a State law within the mea1iing of the Federal Con-
stitution. New Orleans JiVater-works v. Loitisiana Sugar Go., 
125 U. S. 18, 31, 8 S. Ct. 741, 31 L. Ed. 607, 612; '* * * (and 
many cases cited). . 
· " 'Aud any enactment, from whatever source originating, 
to which a State gives the force of law, is a statute of the 
State, within the meaning of the pertinent clause of section 
709; Rev. Stat.; Judicial Code, section 237 (28 U. S. C. A. 
section 344); which confers jurisdiction on this court. Wil-
liams v. Brnff y, 96 U. S. 176, 183, 24 L. Ed. 716, 717.' 
'' Likewise the same court, which of course is the highest 
authority, in the case of Kin_q Mfg. Co. v. City Council of 
Au,qusta, 277 U. S. 100, 48 S. Ct. 489, 72 L. Ed. 801, held a city 
ordinance fixing water power rates applicable to a canal 
owned by the city is a statute of the State in that 
page 19 ~ sense. 
"·We think that the above citations constitute 
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satisfacto~y and eminent authority for the position· which 
we now take, that ordinances or municipal legislative enact-
ments come 'within the meaning of the words of the statute, 
, •required by law.' '' 
Whenever a municipal corporation is acting in the perform-
ance of a g·overnmental function, it is an arm or agency of 
the Commonwealth. The numerous cases holding a munici-
pality not liable for its torts committed while in the perform:-
ance of a g·overnmental function are based on the theory 
that in so acting the municipality was an arm or agency of 
the Commonwealth and to sue it for such would be equivalent 
to suing the Commonwealth. With equal reason, it must 
be held that an ordinance passed by a municipality in aid 
of the per£ ormance of a governmental function is a law of 
the Commonwealth. That. it is limited in its operation in the 
instant case to the City of Dan~ille brings it in the category 
of a special provision of law. There is nothing in the case 
of Martin's Exors. v. Com., 126 Va. 603, contrary to this 
view. 
The Court is therefore of the opinion that when the South-
ern Railway Company defaulted in the payment of the tax 
bill assessed against it for the year 1935 and such default 
continued until June 15th, 1936, the City of Danville became 
entitled to recover the amount of that bill with interest to 
accrue thereon at the rate of six per centum per annum from 
the 15th day of January, 1936, until paid, and in 
page 20 ~ addition thereto, five per centum penalty on the 
principal amount of said bill. 
The principal of the · tax bill having been paid on the 27th 
day of June, 1936, nothing further remained due by the 
Southern Railway Company but the five per cent. penalty and 
the interest that accrued on the tax bill during the time the 
principal amount remained unpaid. I ifind no authoritv for 
allowing interest on the five per cent penalty nor 'On the un-
paid interest. Interest will rur;i from the date of the judg.:. _ 
ment on the total amount of the judgment to be herein ren-
dered. This judgment, however, will be subject to a credit 
of the principal amount of the penalty ($444.90) which bas 
been paid into court. 
FRANK T. SUTTON, JR. 
June 28th, 1939. 
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page 21 } ,Judge A. M. Aiken, 
City Attorney, 
Danville, Virginia. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that we will under the provi-
sions of Sec. 6253a present to the Honorable Henry C. Leigh, 
Regular Judge of the Corporation Court of Danville, at the 
Courthouse, at 10 o'clock A. M., on the 24th of July, 1939, a 
certificate under the provisions of .Sec. 6253, so that, same 
may be signed and made a part of the Record in the case 
of City of Danville v. Southern Railway Company pending 
in the Corporation Court of Danville, and also 
PLEASE BE ADVISED that on the 31st day of July, 
1939, we will apply to the Clerk of the Corporation Court of 
Danville, for a transcript of the Record, so that, we may pro-
ceed to apply for a writ of en·or. 
Respectfully, 
MALCOLM K. HARRIS, 
HARRIS, HARVEY & BROWNs 
Counsel for 
SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY. 
Legal and timely service of the above Notice is accepted. 
page 22 ~ 1Ci ty of Danville 
v. 
Southern Railway Company. 
A. M. AJKEN, 
City Attorney. 
It appearing· to the undersigned, who is the Regular Judge 
of the Corporation Court of Danville that the Attorney of 
Record for the City of Danville has had reasonable notice 
of the time and place when this certificate is presented for 
signature. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED undP,r the provisions of Sec. 
6253 that the following is the agreed statement of facts, or 
written stipulation of counsel referred to in the opinion of 
the Hon. Frank T. Sutton, Jr., the judge who presided at the 
trial of this case, viz., 
28 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
''AGREED STATEMENT _OF FACTS . 
. As of January 1, 1935, the City of Danville, a municipal 
corporation of Virginia, assessed municipal taxes against the 
Southern Railway Company in the total amount of $8,899.05, 
covering levy on real estate and tangible personal property, 
such taxes being for the calendar year 1935. 
On· June 27, 1936, the Southern Railway Company paid to 
D. P. Garvin, City ICollector, said sum of $8,899.05. 
Under date of December 8, 1936, Southern Railway Com-
pany tendered to said D. P. Garvin, City Collector, the smn 
of $457 .60 in payment of all penalties and interest which had 
accrued by reason of the failure of said taxpayer to pay the 
taxes assessed as above for the year 1935, before January 1, 
1936, but said City Collector refused the tender, because he 
claimed that the tender consisted only of $444.96 plus $12.64 
interest, being interest on the penalty from June 1.6, 1936, 
and said City Collector claimed that taxpayer was due the 
City of Danville interest on the penalty of $444.96 from J anu-
ary 15, 1936, and that taxpayer also owed the City of Danville 
interest at 6 per cent on $8,899.05 ( the amount of taxes paid 
June 27, 1936),.from January 16, 1936. The defendant, as of 
· the return day of this notice, paid into court, to 
page 23 ~ the clerk thereof, the sum of $457.60 (made up of 
the penalty of $444.96 and interest thereon of 
$12.64), which had been tendered to Hon. D. P. Garvin, Col-
lector. 
The only question in this case is whether the taxpayer owes 
interest on the assessment of $8,899.05. The City of Dan-
ville claims that def P.ridant was liable for interest on the prin-
cipal and the penalty from January 15, 1936. Defendant has 
paid into court the penalty of 5 per cent and interest thereon 
to date same was tendered the City Collector, and contends. 
that inaRmuch as it paid the taxes before .June 30, 1936, no 
interest accrued, and it is therefore not liable for interest.'' 
AND IT FURTHER A:PPEAR.S and is hereby certified that 
thJs ease was s1~bmitted to the Oourt for decision on all ques-
tions of law and fact, neithet ·side desiring a jury, and that 
the order entered by the Hon. Frank T. Sutton, Jr., Judge 
Desig-nate who presided, is the final order of judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff against the defendant, entered on July 
5, 1939; 
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NOW THEREFORE THIS CERTIFICATE is signed, 
sealed and made a part of the Record on this the 24th day of 
July, 1939. 
Teste: 
HENRY C. LEIGH, (Seal) 
,Judge Corporation Court of Danville. 
page 24 ~. State of Virp;inia, 
City of Danville, to-wit: 
I, .0. Stuart Wheatley, Clerk of the Corporation Court of 
Danville, do hereby certify t}iat the foregoing· is a true tran-
script of so much of the record and judicial proceedings of 
said Court as I have been directed to copy in a certain no-
tice of motion to recover judgment, lately pending in said 
Court between the City of Danville, plaintiff, and the South-
ern Railway Company, defendant. 
And I further certify that the plaintiff has filed with me 
a written notice to the defendant of its intention to apply 
for a transcript of said record, which notice l1as been duly 
accepted by A. l\L Aiken, City Attorney for the City of Dan-
ville, plaintiff. · 
Given under my hand this 27th clay of July, 1939. 
C. STUART ,vHEATLEY, Clerk. 
Clerk's Fee for copy of record: $10.00. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. ·w ATTS, C. C. 
-· 
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